This paper uses a natural experiment approach to identify the effects of an exogenous change in future pension benefits on workers' training participation. We use unique matched survey and administrative data for male employees in the public sector in the Netherlands who were subject to a major pension reform in 2006. We compare training participation of workers who were born in 1949 and remain entitled to generous pension rights under the old system to those who were born in 1950 and are subject to a new less generous system. We find that the exogenous shock in pension rights postpones expected retirement and has a small but positive effect on training participation of older workers.
Introduction
This study focuses on the impact of the abolishment of generous early retirement systems on training participation. Human capital theory predicts that early retirement systems have a negative effect on human capital formation. It is argued that the present value of net returns to human capital investments of older workers are lower due to the shorter period in which they can reap the benefits of their investments (see : Becker, 1975; BenPorath, 1967; Echevarría; 2003) . In economic literature, the relationship between early retirement and training investments has hardly been empirically studied. One exception is the study of Fouarge and Schils (2007) who found a positive relationship between training and the age of retirement. However, the latter study is not able to establish the direction of causality between training investments and retirement expectations. Other empirical studies have focused on related questions. Several studies analyzed the effects of shocks in life expectancy on human capital investments (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney; . These studies found that a drop in mortality rates, which increases the potential period in which investment benefits can be reaped, induced investments in human capital. Other studies have focused on pensions coverage and training, and found that workers who participate in training are more likely to have pension coverage (Johnson, 1996; Dorsey and Macpherson, 1997) . Because pension coverage induces early retirement (see the studies of Stock and Wise, 1990; Samwick, 1998; Bingley and Lanot; 2002; Chan and Stevens, 2004) , training participation may have an indirect negative effect on the retirement age. The results of the latter studies imply that causality in the relationship between expected retirement and training participation may run in two directions.
In this paper we exploit a natural experiment in the Dutch public sector to examine the causal relation of an exogenous decrease in pension rights on training participation.
The Dutch public sector was subject to a major pension reform that became effective on January 1, 2006. The reform consisted of the abolishment of the pre-pension schemes for everyone born after December 31, 1949. If employees were born before 1950 and have been working in the public sector continuously since April 1, 1997, they remained entitled to the more generous old pre-pension rights. This means that they can retire at the age of 62 year and 3 months at a replacement rate of 70 percent. Employees born after 1949, however, are subject to a new less generous pension system which effectively lowers pension wealth.
We use unique matched survey and administrative pension fund data of male employees in the public sector who were born in these two years. The data are gathered one year after the introduction of the new pension system. The data incorporate detailed information on older employees' individual pension rights, expected sources of income after retirement and training participation. We compare training participation of workers who were born just before the threshold and remain entitled to their old generous pension rights with those who were born just after the break and therefore are subject to the new pension system. The limited age difference between the treatment and control group in our sample and the simple and transparent age criterium determining the entitlement to the old or new pension rights guaranties the internal validity of the experiment.
We find that the postponement of retirement due to the shock in pension rights has a positive impact on the training participation of older men. Moreover, workers who are confronted with reduced pension rights spent more hours on training. However, the effect is rather small, which implies that workers probably have more restrictions to further investments in their human capital than the restricted time period in which they can benefit from these training investments. The results remain robust when reducing our sample to workers who were born more closely around January 1, 1950 or adding various control variables.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the exogenous shock in the public sectors' pension system in the Netherlands. In Section 3, we present our estimation strategy. The data and the final sample selection are described in Section 4.
Results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Reform of the public sectors' pension system in the
Netherlands

A. The Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars: 1) At the age of 65, all Dutch inhabitants are entitled to a state old age pension financed by contributions that are levied as part of the income tax, 2) In general, employees are entitled to a supplementary sectoral pension of the defined benefit type and 3) To some extent, individuals can voluntarily build up savings typically taken as annuities through an insurance company. Early retirement before the commencement date of the state pension is made possible through the existence of early retirement schemes. Early retirement schemes are negotiated between unions and employer organizations at the sectoral or firm level and are officially laid down in collective agreements. The pension schemes are the shared responsibility of the social partners and the administration of the early retirement schemes is delegated to pension funds. In general, for individual workers participation in sectoral pension and early retirement schemes is mandatory. Both employers and employees contribute to the pension fund. Until 2006 early retirement schemes were facilitated by the government through a preferential tax treatment which due to the progressive tax system gave high tax advantages (Euwals et al., 2006) .
B. Changes in the pension system for public workers
In 2006, a reform in the Dutch pension system took place which provides the basis of our natural experiment. In line with its policy to stimulate labor force participation of older workers, the government abolished the favorable tax treatment of early retirement schemes for all workers born after 1949. Since 2000, these workers are no longer allowed to deduct pension contributions from their gross wage. The abolishment of the tax treatment was not limited to the public sector but did also apply to workers in other sectors.
As in the other sectors, anticipation on the change in tax rules formed the input for collective bargaining on the introduction of a new pension scheme for the public sector in Summer 2005. The new scheme (ABP flexible pension scheme) was launched at January 1, 2006 by the pension fund of the public sector (ABP). Workers born before 1950 and who worked continuously since April 1, 1997 in the public sector remain entitled to the generous old pre-pension rights which means that they can retire at the age of 62 years and 3 months at a replacement rate of 70 percent. However, employees born after 1949 and workers born before 1950 who did not work continuously in the public sector in the last 10 years are subject to the new and less generous system. The new flexible pension system is characterized by a drop in pension wealth, an increase in the pension contribution payments to partly account for this drop in pension wealth and stronger incentives to continue working generated by penalties on pension income when retiring before the commencement date of the state pension and supplements when retiring later. For younger workers, the increase in pension contributions partly repairs the decrease in pension wealth over time.
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Opposed to young workers, public workers born just after 1949 do not have enough time to repair this drop in pension wealth. Therefore, as a consequence of both the abolishment of the tax rules and the steeper early retirement scheme, workers born just after 1949 have been confronted with a substantial decrease in pension wealth and will have to retire at a higher age to reach a replacement rate of 70%.
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An average worker in the public sector who was born in 1950 will have a replacement rate of 64% when he or she is 62 years and 3 months old and has to postpone retirement until the age of 63 years and 4 months in order to reach a replacement rate of 70%, while workers born before 1950 are already eligible for this replacement rate at the age of 62 years and 3 months. 
C. Familiarity with exogenous shock in pension wealth
For the identification of our natural experiment, public sector workers have to be familiar with the consequences of the new pension system for their individual situation. To make the introduction of the new pension system known to their customers, ABP launched a campaign in the second half of 2005 to explain the implications of the new system. A special newspaper was devoted to the new pension system in which unions, employer organizations and ABP jointly explained the new flexible pension scheme. All 1.2 million ABP participants received a letter on the core elements of the new scheme and a complete electronic service pack for public service employers had been developed. Therefore, at 1 January 2006 most public sector workers born after 1949 and their employers were familiar Because participation in the pension system of the public sector is mandatory, workers born after 1949 were not able not evade the new pension scheme.
with the exogenous shock in their pension rights. As a consequence employees could react by changing their retirement date expectations, increasing investments in their human capital or changing their individual private (pension) savings.
Empirical strategy
For identifying the causal effect of the abolishment of early retirement schemes on human capital investments, we make use of a natural experiment. A known discontinuity in the treatment assignment is used to identify the treatment effect. In our application, assignment to the treatment in pension rights depends in a deterministic way on the birth date of public worker i (b i ) with a known discontinuity at the birth date of 1 January 1950 (b). The assignment rule to the pension reform treatment has the following form
where d i is the assignment indicator. The probability of receiving training can be stated as
where α = E(t 0i ) is the training probability without an exogenous change in pension rights and β = E(t 1i ) − E(t 0i ) is the difference in training probability caused by the treatment effect.
There is no indication that persons close tob are subject to discontinuities other than the difference in pension rights. Therefore, comparing the training investment behavior of workers who were born in 1949 and remain entitled to their old generous pension rights with those who were born in 1950 and are subject to the new pension system will give unbiased estimates of the treatment effect (see Hahn et al. (2001) for a discussion of regularity conditions at the threshold for selection):
where t
We estimate the treatment effect with regression models of the form
where T i indicates training participation of worker i and D i is the treatment dummy variable which is 0 if workers were born in 1949 or 1 if workers were born in 1950.
We control for the number of years in which workers have built up their pension P i . Y i is the yearly wage income, M i stands for marital status and i is a random error. We also include additional control variables (X i ). Among others, we controlled for 11 alternative potential pension income sources, employees' discount rates, education attainment and the sub-sector of the employees. Because workers could anticipate for 5 months on the change in the pension system, it is also necessary to account for the possibility that workers restored part of their pension wealth by increasing their personal pension savings. 
Data
A. Matched survey and administrative data and comparison groups
We use detailed matched survey data and administrative data for male employees in the public sector which have been collected in two stages one year after the introduction of the new pension system. The survey data has been matched to administrative data of the pension fund of the government sector (ABP) which provides information on individual pension rights built up at the ABP, annual wage income, tenure in the public sector, size of the organization employed in, and the number of working hours.
We restricted the analysis to employees who have worked for at least 10 years continuously in the public sector because workers born before 1950 who did not work continuously in the public sector during the last 10 years are also subject to the new pension system. This restriction is made to avoid complications concerning unobserved characteristics of workers which simultaneously may affect training participation and the eligibility 6 The focus on male employees follows from the fact that in general male workers with the age of 56 or 57 are the main wage earner in the Netherlands while female workers have disrupted careers. Moreover, only a small selective group females of these birth cohorts is still working.
7 The likelihood of selectivity bias due to questioning through internet is negligible because at least 91% of the public workers aged 55 years or older has an internet connection at home (TNS nipo, 2006) . Moreover, a large number of respondents filled in the questionnaire at work.
for pension rights. 
B. Descriptives
For the validity of the natural experiment, it is essential that the individuals in the treatment and control group do not have different characteristics except the deviation in pension rights. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample, the treatment group and control group are presented in Table 1 . It becomes clear that the differences between the treatment and the control group are indeed extremely small. There is no difference in the organization size, the individual discount rate, marital status or the income of the partner between the two groups. Moreover, the individuals in both groups have similar levels of education and are equally distributed over sub sectors and birth months. The number of years individuals built up pension rights at the public sectors' pension fund and the yearly wage income are slightly higher for the control group. However, this reflects the limited age difference between the control and the treatment group. The table also shows that approximately 23% of all workers in our sample increased their pension savings since 2006. As can be expected, the additional savings level is slightly higher for the treatment group.
Insert Table 1 about here Table 2 provides an exploratory analysis of the changes in retirement expectations and the treatment effect. The table shows that the decrease in pension rights due to the pension system reform increases the retirement age. Employees who were born in 1949 expect on average to retire at the age of 62 years and 6 months while employees born in 1950 anticipate to retire when they are 63 year and 4 months old. Moreover, the expected replacement rate at the age of 62 years is 72.0% for the control group and 66.2% for the treatment group. Figure 1 and 2 present a scatter plot of the differences in the mean expected retirement age and mean expected pension benefits per birth month and show that these deviations between the treatment and control group emerge precisely around the threshold of January 1, 1950 (i.e. month 13). Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that employees are indeed familiar with the consequences of the new pension system for their individual situation. Moreover, the sample averages in Table 2 indicate that employees appear to have reasonably accurate retirement expectations, although employees in the treatment group more often indicate that they do not have a good overview of their pension rights.
Insert Table 2 about here
It is striking that the mean expected retirement age in the treatment group is 63 years and 4 months which corresponds closely to a replacement rate of 70% for an average public sector employee. On average, employees in the control group expect to retire only 2 months after they become eligible for the early retirement benefit based on the pre-pension system to which they are still entitled. For both the control group and the treatment group, the expected retirement benefit at the age of 62 years is only 2%-points above the benefit which they on average actually get.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here
The variable of interest in our analysis is employees' training participation. The training participation indicator measures whether employees participated in a training course which was useful for their present job in 2006. The table shows that training incidence is about 3 percent higher in the treatment group. This indicates that the exogenous shock in pension rights may have affected human capital investments. However, compared to the high training incidence in the treatment group as well as the control group, this difference is rather limited.
The high level of training participation reflects that many employees participated in relatively small courses. About 50% of the whole sample participated in a course which lasted shorter than an average workweek of 40 hours. A potential weakness of our training indicator is that positive effects of a short training course on productivity are more likely to wear out in a short time period and that the opportunity cost are low. Therefore, participation in short courses may not yet have been affected by the expected time to retirement.
Estimation results
A. Expected time to retirement and training participation without accounting for reversed causality
In this section, we first estimate the effect of the expected time to retirement on training participation in 2006 without using the treatment dummy variable as an instrument. The expected time to retirement is calculated by subtracting the age of the individual in 2006 from the expected retirement age. Table 3 reports the estimation results.
Insert Table 3 
B. Treatment effect on training participation
The analysis so far did not exploit the exogenous policy shock. As a consequence, the previous results are subject to potential causality problems. The question is whether anticipation on early retirement affects training, or that training investments induces later retirement.
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This section discusses estimates of the treatment dummy variable on training participation as described in equation 4. Table 4 reports the estimates for the complete sample and the sub samples of those born within a smaller range around January 1st, 1950. Considering the estimates for the complete sample, we find a small but significant treatment effect. The treatment effect is about 3.2%, which is slightly higher than in the previous estimations.
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When the sample is reduced to employees born within a range of 6 months around the treatment threshold, however, we find that the treatment effect is not statistically different from zero. The sample is too small to identify the treatment effect. Within the range of 9 months around the treatment threshold, we find a weakly significant effect.
Insert Table 4 about here
As has been mentioned earlier, it is likely that we underestimate the treatment effect 10 It can be expected that employees in the treatment group have larger incentives to invest in their human capital compared to those in the control group. Several studies have found sizable private returns to training. Using the European Community Household Panel, Bassanini et al. (2005) found that the private return to training on the log hourly wage is approximately 3.7% in the Netherlands. This means that an average worker in our dataset will have a yearly return of 1,665 euro. The extra return to employees born in 1950 compared to the non-treated group due to the expected postponement of their retirement is approximately 1,388 euro. In total, the return to training for employees born in 1950 until retirement will be equal to about 12,300 euro while employees who are born in 1949 have a return of 9,300.
11 We have tested whether our estimations are biased due to selectivity. It could be argued that more motivated employees were also more prepared to respond to the questionnaire. It is possible that employees born just after 1949 did not wish to cooperate because of their frustration over the change in the pension system. In that case, our previous estimations of the treatment effect may be biased. However, our results remain robust when estimating probit models accounting for sample selection on training participation following the approach of Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) . Moreover, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no selection bias due to the fact that many individuals only participated in small training courses. In general, these courses will only have short term effects on productivity while the employees in our sample still have to work for approximately 6 or 7 years until they retire. Hence, it is possible that participation in small courses has not yet been affected by the change in pension rights and the expected time to retirement. Therefore, we perform additional analyzes on participation in large courses and on the number of training hours. We constructed an indicator for participation in large training courses which is coded 1 if employees participated in a training course in 2006 which lasted more than 48 hours and 0 otherwise.
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The variable measuring the number of training hours is based on a survey question which asked how many hours employees had spent on the training course in which they invested the most time. The variable is coded 0 if workers did not train. The estimation results are presented in Table 5 . Columns 1 and 2 present the LPM estimations on participation in large courses. According to expectations, we find a significant treatment effect on participation in large training courses. Surprisingly, the treatment effect (2,7%) does not deviate much from the effect found in the previous estimations on the initial indicator for training participation. Columns 3 and 4 give the tobit estimations on the number of training hours. In both estimations, we find a large treatment effect on the number hours spent on the training in which employees spent the most time.
Insert Table 5 about here
Conclusion
Human capital theory predicts that early retirement systems have a negative effect on human capital formation because they reduce the period in which the benefits of the 12 Employees spent on average 48 hours on training courses. 48 hours correspond to 6 workdays.
investments can be reaped. In this study, a natural experiment was used to identify the effects of an exogenous change in pension wealth on older employees' training participation. For this purpose, we used matched survey and administrative data for male employees in the public sector in the Netherlands which was subject to a large pension reform in 2006. We compared employees who are born just before the threshold of January 1, 1950 and remain entitled to their old generous pension rights with those who are just born after the break and are subject to the new system.
Because employees could also react on the change in pension rights by increasing their private pension savings, we also corrected for other potential income sources after retirement and extra pension savings since the introduction of the new pension system. However, accounting for the increase in pension savings and additional income sources did not affect the treatment effect.
Using simple LPM regressions, we found a positive relationship between the expected time to retirement and training participation. Because causality cannot be established in these regressions, we proceeded with estimations which exploited the experimental character of the data. We still found a positive treatment effect on training participation for the whole sample. Moreover, employees in the treatment group do not only participate more in training courses, but also spent more hours on training. However, the size of the treatment effect is rather small in our estimations, which may indicate that employees have more restrictions to further investments in their human capital than the restricted time period in which they can benefit from these training investments. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample averages. The number of pension years and the yearly wage income are extracted out of administrative data of the pension fund (ABP) for the public sector.
The number of pension years variable indicates how many years individuals build up pension rights at the ABP.
The individual discount rate is based on two questions which measure the extra amount of money individuals wish to receive if payment of price winnings is delayed with one year. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample averages. 
